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Abstract¡ In this paper, we use the ten security requirements 
proposed by Liao et al. for a smart card based authentication 
protocol to examine five recent work in this area. After analyses, 
we found that the protocols of  Juang et al.¡s , Hsiang et al.¡s, 
Kim et al.¡s, and Li et al.¡s all suffer from offline password 
guessing attack if the smart card is lost, and the protocol of Xu et 
al.¡s is subjected to an insider impersonation attack.  
Keywords- password authentication protocol; insider attack; 
smart card loss problem; password guessing attack 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Password authentication protocols have been widely 
adopted for a user to access a remote server over an insecure 
network. In recent, many smart card password authentication 
protocols [1-20] are proposed, which emphasizes two-factor 
authentication mechanism to enhance the user end¡s security. 
One factor is the user-rememberable password while the other 
factor is the user-possessing smart card which is a tamper-
resistant device with storage and computational power. 
Moreover, recent studies investigated a weakness of a 
traditional password authentication protocol. That is, in the 
traditional one the server usually maintains a password or 
verification table to store user authentication data. However, 
this approach will make the system easily subjected to 
impersonation or stolen-verifier attack if the table is 
compromised.  
In 2006, Liao et al. [2] identified ten security requirements 
to evaluate a smart card based password authentication protocol. 
We show them as follows. 
R1. It needs no password or verification table in the server.  
R2. The client can choose and change his password freely.  
R3. The client needs not to reveal their password to the server 
even in the registration phase.  
R4. The password should not be transmitted in plaintext over 
the network.  
R5. It can resist insider (a legal user) attack.  
R6. It can resist replay attack, password guessing attack, 
modification-verification-table attack, and stolen-verifier 
attack.  
R7. The length of a password should be appropriate for 
memorization. 
R8. It should be efficient and practical.  
R9. It should achieve mutual authentication.  
R10. It should resist offline password guessing attack even if 
the smart card is lost. 
In their article, they also proposed a protocol to satisfy 
these ten security requirements. But Xiang et al. [9] 
demonstrated that their protocol suffers from both the replay 
attack and the password guessing attack. Other than theirs, 
many efforts trying to propose a secure protocol were made 
recently. For example in 2008, Juang et al. [7] proposed an 
efficient password authenticated key agreement using bilinear 
pairings. In 2009, Hsiang et al. [14], Kim et al. [16], and Xu et 
al. [18] each also proposed a protocol of this kind, respectively. 
In this year 2010, Li et al.[20] also proposed a protocol in this 
area. Although they claimed their protocols are secure. 
However, in this paper, we will show some weaknesses in [18], 
[7], [14], [16], [20], correspondingly. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In 
Section II, we review and attack on the scheme of Juang et 
al.¡s [7]. Then we review and attack on the protocols of 
Hsiang et al. ¡s [14], Kim et al. [16], Xu et al. ¡s [18], and Li et 
al. ¡s [20] in Section III through VI, respectively. Finally, a 
conclusion is given in Section VIII. 
II. REVIEW AND ATTACK ON JUANG ET AL.'S SCHEME  
In their scheme [7], if an attacker gets C¡s smart card, he 
can successfully launch an offline password guessing attack. 
Hence, the scheme cannot satisfy requirement R10. In the 
following, we first review Juang et al.¡s protocol and then 
show the attack on the protocol.  
A. Review 
Their protocol consists of four phases: the setup phase, the 
registration phase, the login and authentication phase, and the 
password changing phase. 
In the setup phase, server S chooses two secrets s, x and 
publishes Ps = sP, where P is a generator of an additive cyclic 
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group G1 with a prime order q. S also publish a secure hash 
function H(¡). 
In the registration phase, user i register his IDi and H(PWi, b) 
to server S. S issues a smart card which contains bi (bi = 
Ex[H(PWi, b), IDi, H(H(PWi, b), IDi)], Ex[M] which is a 
ciphertext of M encrypted by S¡s secret key x), and b (a random 
number chosen by i). 
When i wants to login into S, i starts the login and 
authentication phase, and sends {aP, α} to S, where a is a 
random number chosen by i, α = EKa[bi], Ka = H(aP, Ps, Q, 
e(Ps, aQ)), e: G1¡ G1→G2 is a bilinear mapping, Q = h(IDs), h(¡) 
is a map-to-point hash function, h:{0,1}*→G1, and IDs is S¡s 
identification. Subsequently, S chooses a random number r, 
computes the session key sk = H(H(aP, Ps, Q, e(aP, sQ)), r, IDi, 
IDs) = H(Ka, r, IDi, IDs) since e(Ps, aQ) = e(aP, sQ) , and sends 
{Auths, r} to user i, where Auths = H(Ka, H(PWi, b), r, sk), and 
H(PWi, b) is obtained from decrypting α and bi. Then, i 
computes the session key sk. To authenticate S, user i verifies 
Auths to see if it is equal to H(Ka, H(PWi, b), r, sk). If it is, i 
computes and sends {Authi} to S, where Authi = H(Ka, H(PWi, 
b), r+1, sk) and H(PWi, b) is the hash result of b stored in the 
smart card with PWi inputted by i. Finally, to authenticating i, S 
checks to see if Authi is equal to H(Ka, H(PWi, b), r+1, sk). 
B. Attack 
In the protocol, supposed that user C lost his smart card and 
the card is got by an insider E, E can impersonate C to login 
into S without any detection. We show the attack in the 
following. 
E first reads out b and bc (which equals Ex[H(PWc, b), IDc, 
H(H(PWc, b), IDc)]) stored in C¡s smart card but he doesn¡t 
have the knowledge of PWc.  
In the login and authentication phase, E chooses a random 
number c, computes cP, Kc = H(cP, Ps, Q, e(Ps, cQ)), α = 
EKc[bc], and sends {cP, α} to S. After receiving the message, S 
chooses a random number r, computes session key sk = H(Kc, r, 
IDc, IDs), Auths = H(Kc, H(PWc, b), r, sk), and sends {Auths, r} 
to C. E intercepts the message and launches an off-line 
password guessing attack as follows.  
E chooses a candidate password PW' from a dictionary, 
computes Kc = H(cP, Ps, Q, e(Ps, cQ)), sk = H(Kc, r, IDc, IDs), 
H(Kc, H(PW', b), r, sk) and checks to see if it is equal to the 
received Auths. If it is, the attacker successfully gets C¡s 
password PWc which is equal to PW'. Subsequently, E can 
masquerade as C by using PW' and C¡s smart card to log into S. 
That is, Juang et al.¡s cannot satisfy the security requirement 
R10: It should resist password guessing attack even if the smart 
card is lost. 
III. REVIEW AND ATTACK ON THE PROTOCOL OF HSIANG ET 
AL.'S SCHEME  
In this section, we first review Hsiang et al.¡s protocol [14] 
and then demonstrate a smart card lost and offline password 
guessing attack on the protocol. 
A. Review 
In the protocol, when user C wants to change his password, 
he inserts his card and types his ID and PW. The smart card 
computes P* = R⊕H(b⊕PW), and V* = H(P*⊕H(PW )), and 
compares V* with V, where PW is C¡s old password, and R, b, 
and V are stored in C¡s smart card. If they are equal, the card 
verifies user C and accepts his password change request. The 
card subsequently ask C a new password PW* and then 
computes Rnew = P*⊕H(b⊕ PW*) and Vnew = H(P*⊕
H(PW*)). Finally, the card replaces V with Vnew. 
B. Attack 
Assume that an attacker E who gets C¡s smart card, reads 
the values of R, b, and V, and then launches an offline 
password guessing attack as follows. E chooses a candidate 
password PW' from a dictionary, computes P' = R⊕H(b⊕
PW' ) and V' = H(P'⊕H(PW' )), and checks to see if V' and V 
are equal. If they are, PW' is the correct password.  
IV. REVIEW AND ATTACK ON THE PROTOCOL OF KIM ET 
AL.'S SCHEME  
In this section, we first review Kim et al.¡s protocol [16] 
and then demonstrate a smart card lost and offline password 
guessing attack on the protocol. 
A. Review 
In their protocol, when user C wants to change his 
password, he inserts his card and types his ID and PW. The 
smart card computes K*1 = R⊕H(PW) and compares K*1 with 
K1 to see if they are equal, where R (=K1⊕H(PWc)) and K1 
(=H(ID⊕x)⊕N ) are stored in C¡s smart card, PWc is chosen 
by the user when he registers himself to the remote server S, 
and N is a random number. If they are equal, the card verifies 
user C and accepts his password change request. C 
subsequently asks C a new password PW*, and then computes 
R* = K*1⊕H(PW*) and K*2 =K2⊕H(PW⊕H(PW))⊕ H(PW* 
⊕H(PW*)), where K2 = H(ID⊕x⊕N)⊕H(PWc ⊕H(PWc)) is 
also stored in C¡s smart card. Finally, the smart card will 
replace R and K2 with R* and K*2, respectively. 
B. Attack 
An attacker E who gets C¡s smart card, reads the values of 
R, K1, and K2, and then launches an offline password guessing 
attack as follows. E chooses a candidate password PW' from a 
dictionary, computes K'1 = R⊕H(PW'), and checks to see if 
K'1 and K1 are equal. If they are, PW' is the correct password.  
V. REVIEW AND ATTACK ON THE PROTOCOL OF XU ET AL.'S 
SCHEME  
Xu et al.¡s protocol [18] can not satisfy security 
requirements R3 (The client needs not to reveal their password 
to the server) and R5 (It can resist insider attack). We show 
the scheme and its violations as follows. 
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A. Review 
Xu et al.¡s protocol [18] consists of three phases: the 
registration phase, the login phase, and the authentication 
phase. 
In the registration phase, user C submits his IDc and PWc 
to the server S. S issues C a smart card which stores C¡s 
identity IDc, and B = H(IDc)x + H(PWc), where x is S¡s secret 
key and PWc is C¡s password. 
In the login phase, user C inputs IDc and PWc to his smart 
card. The card obtains timestamp T, chooses a random number 
v, computes Bc = (B¡ H(PWc))v = H(IDc)x v, W = H(IDc)v, and C1 
= H(T, Bc, W, IDc), and sends {IDc, C1, W, T } to S. 
In the authentication phase, after receiving {IDc, C1, W, T } 
at time T*, S computes Bs = W x, and checks to see if IDc is 
valid, T* −T < ∆T, and C1 is equal to H(T, Bs, W, IDc). If they 
are, S selects a random number m, gets timestamp Ts, 
computes M = H(IDc)m, Cs = H(M, Bs, Ts, IDc), and sends {IDc, 
Cs, M, Ts} to C. After receiving the message, C verifies IDc 
and Ts, computes H(M, Bc, Ts, IDc), and compares it with the 
received Cs. If they are equal, S is authentic. Then, C and S 
can compute the common session key as sk = H(IDc, M, W, M v) 
and sk = H(IDc, M, W, W m), respectively. 
B. Weaknesses 
First, the scheme obviously violates security requirement 
R3 since the client transmits clear password in the registration 
phase. 
Second, we show an impersonation attack on the scheme 
below. Assume that a malicious insider U wants to 
masquerade as C to access S¡s resources. He reads B from his 
smart card, obtains system¡s timestamp Tu, chooses a random 
number r, computes Bu = (B¡ H(PWu))r = H(IDu)xr, W = H(IDc)r, 
C1 = H(Tu, Bu, W, IDc), and sends {IDc, C1, W, Tu } to S. 
After receiving the message, S validates IDc and Tu, 
computes Bs = W x = H(IDc)r x, and checks to see if the received 
C1 is equal to the computed H(Tu, Bs, W, IDc). In this case, we 
can see that C1 is obviously equal to H(Tu, Bs, W, IDc). Hence, 
U (who masquerades as C) is authentic. Finally, S obtains 
timestamp Ts and sends {IDc, Cs, M, Ts } to U, where M = 
H(IDc)m and m is a random number chosen by S. U also can 
compute the session key as sk = H(IDc, M, W, M r ) shared with 
S. Therefore, user U¡s insider impersonation attack succeeds. 
VI. REVIEW AND ATTACK ON THE PROTOCOL OF LI ET AL.'S 
SCHEME  
In this section, we first review the registration phase, login 
phase and authentication phase of the protocol in Li et al.¡s 
[20], and then present our attack on the protocol. 
A. Review 
In the registration phase, user C submits his IDc, PWc, and 
his personal biometric Bc to the server S. S issues a smart card 
for C, which stores the values of IDc, fc = H(Bc), and ec=H(IDc, 
x)⊕H(PWc, fc), where x is S¡s secret key. 
In the login phase, user C keys IDc and PWc to his smart 
card and inputs his personal biometric Bc on the specific 
device to check if H(Bc) is equal to fc stored in the smart card. 
If it is, the card selects a random number Rc, computes M1 = ec
⊕H(PWc, fc) = H(IDc, x), M2 = M1⊕Rc, and sends {IDc, M2} 
to S. 
In the authentication phase, after receiving {IDc, M2}, S 
checks to see if IDc is valid. If it is, S chooses a random 
number RS, computes M3 = H(IDc, x), M4 = M2⊕M3 = Rc, M5 = 
M3⊕RS, M6 = H(M2, M4), and sends {M5, M6} to C. After 
receiving S¡s message, C verifies whether M6 is equal to H(M2, 
Rc). If it is, S is authentic. C then computes M7 = M5⊕M1 = M3
⊕RS⊕M1 = H(IDc, x)⊕RS⊕H(IDc, x) = RS, M8 = H(M5, M7), 
and sends {M8} to S. After receiving C¡s message, S verifies 
whether M8 is equal to H(M5, Rs). If it is, C is authentic. S then 
accepts C¡s login request. 
B. Attack 
Assume that an attacker E gets C¡s smart card and reads 
the values of IDc, fc and ec. He can launch an offline password 
guessing attack by sending only one login request to the server. 
We show the attack as follows.  
E chooses a random number Me and sends {IDc, Me} to S. 
After receiving the message, S checks to see if IDc is valid. If 
it is, S chooses a random number RS, computes M3 = H(IDc, x), 
M4 = Me⊕M3, M5 = M3⊕RS, M6 = H(Me, M4), and sends {M5, 
M6} to E. After receiving S¡s message, E terminates the 
communication, chooses a candidate password PW' from a 
dictionary, computes M' = H(Me, Me⊕ec⊕H(PW', fc)), and 
compares to see if M' is equal to M6. If they are, PW' is the 
correct password, since Me⊕ec⊕H(PW', fc) = Me⊕H(IDc, x)
⊕H(PWc, fc)⊕H(PW', fc). If PW' =PWc, then the equation 
equals to Me⊕H(IDc, x) which equals to Me⊕M3 = M4. That is, 
M' = H(Me, M4) = M6.  
VII. CONCLUSION  
Smart-card based password authentication protocols 
provide two-factor authentication mechanism to improve the 
user end¡s security than the traditional ones. Liao et al. 
proposed ten security requirements to evaluate this kind of 
protocols. According these ten requirements, we investigate 
recent five schemes. Juang et al.¡s scheme suffers smart card 
lost and impersonation attack.  Kim et al.¡s, Hsiang et al.¡s, 
and Li et al.¡s schemes are subjected to smart card lost and 
offline password guessing attack. Finally, Xu et al.¡s scheme 
has weakness of insider impersonation attack. 
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